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Rossella Ciocca
Plurality, Identity, Democracy, Globalization…
A Conversation with Sunil Khilnani
Plurality or Fragmentation?
RC: Multiplicity can be considered the key feature of the Indian
Subcontinent. Recurrent invasions and foreign dominations have configured
its past whether in terms of an arena of clashing civilizations or as a
fruitful history of cultural encounters. Today ethnic, religious, linguistic
varieties still compose a tessellated nation. Society is crossed by differences
that the heritage of the caste-system makes more numerous, complex and
difficult to overcome than in any other country. For better or worse, India
appears intrinsically, irretrievably plural.
Commentators and scholars agree on the substantially mixed nature of
the country. And yet, with regard to its political perspectives, they tend to
divide or at least to be internally divided between hopes and fears. More
optimistically multiplicity is confidently believed to be able to ripen into
pluralism; on the other hand it is feared that conflicting diversities may
develop entropic tendencies capable of making India implode and collapse.
Professor Khilnani, what do you see in the future of your home-country?
I mean would you still describe India in terms of Nehru’s idea of “some
ancient palimpsest on which layer upon layer of thought and reverie had
been inscribed”?1
Do you think that the dialogic, argumentative, non-clerical tradition
Amartya Sen has helped to unearth will check the revisionist reconstruction
of India as a fundamentally Hindu civilizational unity?
And finally would you still be ready to celebrate, in your own words,
“the mongrel character of India’s peoples and their histories”(XI), “its ability
to transform invasion into accommodation, rupture into continuity,
division into diversity”(XII)?
SK: When asked about the future, my initial instinct is to look back at
the past for some clues – not because the past determines the future, but
it does offer a set of probabilities on the basis of which one can try to say
something about what is still unknown. If one looks back over the past 60
years of India’s history, there have been recurrent periods of crisis when
India seemed to be on the verge of losing its identity as a plural, tolerant
space of democratic experience: this was true in the 1970s, when it was
wracked by struggles over language, in the mid-1970 era of the Emergency,
1 Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of
India (London: Penguin,
2003), XV.
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during the violent secessionism of the 1980s, and perhaps above all during
the 1990s, which saw the rise of an intolerant, aggressive Hindutva. Each
of these episodes no doubt has affected, and sometimes scarred, India’s
identity – but they have not managed to transform its basic character and
shape. Somehow, India has still remained something like that palimpsest
of which Nehru wrote. Hindutva and exclusivist ideologies still remain a
source of potential threat in India today, and I would not underestimate
them – but the intensity that marked the debates over religious identity in
the 1990s has somewhat receded, and the search for a ‘master-cleavage’
through which to divide Indians has so far proved futile. This does not
mean that the identity battles are over in India – some new source to fuel
them will quietly surface again. But the more conflicts a society survives,
the more available resources it has to deal with the next one. It is that –
rather than any belief in ‘dialogic traditions’ (about which actually I am
quite sceptical) - which gives me some hope about the future.
Identity politics
RC: In The Idea of India you wrote: “Indians have poured
their faiths into politics, pinning their hopes to once-great
movements like the Congress Party or to its current challengers
like Hindu nationalism or the surging movements of India’s
lower-caste and Dalit parties. Politics at once divides the
country and constitutes it as a single, shared, crowded space,
proliferating voices and claims and forcing negotiation and
accommodation”(9).
If India has entered modernity through the language of
politics, you went on, her particular way of speaking this
language was not through the liberal lexicon of individual
rights but through the language of community rights and
collective identities. The Constitution itself anchored the
recognition of civil liberties within the larger dimensions of
communal groups. And as the ethos of democratisation
entered the political arena, the hitherto marginalized and low
ranking groups benefited from a principle of positive
discrimination to compensate for the ominous inequalities
and iniquities of the past. The affirmative action of the
‘reservation’ policy, originally intended to be a temporary
expedient, aimed at articulating a space of negotiation and
reparation. Yet its effect was in fact to reinforce the collective,
caste/religion/ethnicity-based, identities it was supposed to
dissolve.
Fig. 1: Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India, 1997,
cover by Francesco Clemente, courtesy of the
author.
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Professor Khilnani, if the individual is a multitude of selves, as so many
writers and intellectuals tend repeatedly to emphasise, how do you see the
phenomenon of prescribing and limiting identities, of enveloping and
flattening the complexity of one’s entire being along the schematic lines of
exclusivist ideologies? What do you make of identities focused through the
lenses of loyalty-filters? I mean, in your opinion, is there a possibility to
reconcile the right of minorities to cultural specificity, on the one hand,
and the free choice of individuals to be exempted from any compulsory
affiliation, on the other? To put it differently, don’t you think that cultural
freedom has to be distinguished from the forced acceptance of any given
or inherited identity?
And finally, considering how widely Indian problems resonate
throughout the world, knocking nowadays at the doors of all democracies,
affected as the latter are by parochial, particularistic internal dialectics
and caught, one way or another, in the international reductionist trap of
the ‘clash of civilizations’ (just for convenience I use here the much abused
expression coined by the late Samuel Huntington), don’t you fear that the
whole globalized world is in danger of becoming a huge universal site of
proliferating identity conflict?
SK: The space for individual rights is under pressure in India: we see this
in the numerous attacks, verbal and physical, directed at India’s artists,
writers, filmmakers, scholars, as well as at ordinary citizens going about
their lives – women who want to go to a bar for a drink, for example
(who a few months ago were subject to a shocking attack by a Hindu
extremist group operating in one of India’s most liberal cities, Bangalore).
What has occurred is a kind of democratization of offense and injury –
every group can now make a claim that its sentiments are being injured
by some one else’s free expression, and can then take the law into their
own hands to curb that free expression. This is to render Mill’s Harm
Principle into a farce, and a dangerous one at that. Indian public debate
needs to address this shrinking of the space of individual liberties; and,
linked to this, a debate too is needed on the commitment, made in the
Constitution, to establishing a common Civil Code (Uniform Civil Code,
UCC) for all Indians. This debate has been captured by the Hindu Right:
but liberals and those who believe in pluralism have also to take it up,
and acknowledge that now, almost 60 years since the Indian Constitution
was promulgated, it is time to ask tough questions about the continuing
legitimacy of India’s legal pluralism.
At the international level, I’m afraid I do see a growing role being
played by nationalist and identitarian claims. I think the view that economic
linkages and convergence – ‘globalization’ – would blunt the edge of such
claims was always very hopeful. And it seems to me that Asia will have to
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face a period of rising and aggressive nationalisms jostling for recognition
in close proximity to one another. That is not a comfortable prospect.
Democracy and its flaws
RC: As you yourself recognize, India’s past and the contingency of its
unity prepared it very poorly for democracy. The dimension of its poverty
and the deeply hierarchical nature of its social order gave little hope that
it could defend and keep its republican institutions and practices in the
long run. Lamenting the contradictions of a system which guaranteed
political equality to all its citizens without providing for free and equal
access to resources and opportunities, the leader of the ‘Untouchables’, B.
R. Ambedkar, poignantly expressed his fear that the whole democratic
project would eventually be impaired by extreme social disparity. The
Subcontinent’s location in the most economically dynamic region of the
world where, nonetheless, as you pointed out, the political regimes in
charge consider the very idea of democracy extraneous to the nature of
the people they govern renders the Indian experiment even more significant
– a sort of historical challenge or a bet made by history.
Professor Khilnani, beyond the limits of all possible western/eurocentric
implications, do you consider the recent 60th anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human rights a date worth recording, and if so, what do
you make of the so called Asian Values? I mean, is, in your opinion, the
democratic option, with all its limits and contradictions, still the most
reliable system for facing the immense problems of development or social
justice in your country? What would you answer to those who lament the
inherent encumbrances and weaknesses of democracy compared with the
supposedly greater efficiency of other political models, such as the Chinese
one, in satisfactorily facing the grave problems of social disadvantage and
extreme poverty?
SK: I have no doubt that democracy anywhere and in general is a
flawed system: so is any form of human endeavour. I would also agree
that democracy in India has its own idiosyncratic imperfections and
partialities: corruption, disenfranchisement, unaccountable power are
all common characteristics of Indian democracy. Yet, equally, I have
no doubt that there is no better or more reliable alternative system
which would be better for India. Democracy is a continual project of
self-improvement, which is also sceptical of any sort of perfectionism;
other political systems generally assume that they are starting from a
position of certitude and perfection – and that is an even greater form
of self-deception.
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The Indian political project is self-avowedly a universalist one: but it
is also one concerned with particular contexts, that’s to say it is not an
abstract but an engaged universalism. Think for instance of some of the
greatest figures who helped to define this project: Tagore, Gandhi, Nehru.
All were universalists, but located in and engaged with particular struggles
and ambitions. The recourse to ‘Asian values’ as a way of rejecting calls
for liberty and democracy seems to me to have been an entirely self-
serving ruse of reigning Asian despots. Finally, to respond to your last
question: I think it is important to insist that democracy is a value in
itself – it is not an instrument for achieving other goals, such as
development or social justice. Those are other goals, no doubt, and
have to be pursued by other means – in a way that does not do damage
to democracy.
RC: Today one of the most effective denunciations of the conditions suffered
by the very poor comes from the story narrated by Aravind Adiga in The
White Tiger, in the form of an ironical epistolary addressed to the Chinese
Prime Minister. In his Booker prize winning novel, through the protagonist,
a low caste entrepreneur who fights his way out of the ‘Darkness’ to
become an affluent businessman in Bangalore, the author gives voice to
the rage and the sense of frustration and exclusion felt by the
underdogs of society.
Indeed most of the flaws and grave deficiencies pointed at
by the fathers of the Indian Republic seem unfortunately to be
still there. Just to name a few of them: the neglect of massive
school education especially in socially backward regions; the
in-built corruption of the political system and its responsibility
in maintaining the status quo, even among the parties born to
defend the rights of the very needy; familism (according to the
ironical ‘relativity theory’ enunciated by Salman Rushdie: “in
India everything is for relatives”); the radically subaltern position
of women among the disadvantaged groups, subjected to the
exploitation and violence perpetrated within the dowry system
and the terrible phenomenon of selective gender-based
abortions; the lack of basic home facilities and infrastructure in
the rural areas; etc...
Going back to the Indian political trends of the last few years,
do you think that the recent option of economic liberalism will
produce more results than the socialist, centralistic vision of the
first decades after Independence? How would you judge the
Indian present in the light of the enthusiastically promising goals
listed in Nehru’s ‘Tryst with destiny’ speech?
Fig. 2: Voters hold their identity cards in a
queue to cast their votes in Badimunda village
in Kandhamal district of Orissa, 2009,
photograph, © Biswaranjan Rout/AP
Fig. 3: Voters show their voter identity cards
before they cast their ballot in Bapally,
Hyderabad, 2009,
 photograph, © REUTERS
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In other words, are you confident about the possibility that in a
reasonable time lapse, the yoke of caste would really be, if not eradicated,
at least substantially reduced in its disproportionate power of interfering
in personal fate and the range of existential choices?
SK: Over the past decade and more, India has been experiencing the
highest growth rates in its history. Undoubtedly this is beginning to
transform the country – in terms of material conditions certainly, but
also very importantly in terms of people’s psychology, their hopes and
fears, their sense of how they should be treated (that really is the insight
of Arvind Aadiga’s novel). Caste too is being transformed – as much by
electoral politics as by economic opportunity – and in this sense India is
experiencing what my friend Christophe Jaffrelot has called a “silent
revolution” through the ballot box. It remains a trap for many millions;
but quite a few are now breaking through this trap.
I would just add that it’s important to remember that economic growth,
even as it solves a variety of problems, generates many new and sometimes
unanticipated problems – some obvious ones for instance concern the
environment, the uneven distribution of the benefits of growth, the
consequent internal migration this often creates, and so on. India’s challenge
is going to be as much how it deals with the consequences of growth.
Globalization and culture
RC: Globalization is not a new phenomenon. In the past, cross-cultural
dialogue and commerce have produced circulations of ideas which greatly
contributed to the development of many countries and to the shaping of
modernity itself. India-China relations, for example, were highly productive
for each other around the end of the first millennium and they also
contributed, via Persian and Arabic cultures, to the birth and spread of
notions that were fundamental for Europe’s subsequent Renaissance.
Today the role played by culture is considered central in theoretical
reflections upon the way Globalization is taking shape. It is currently
maintained that while cultural homogenisation, resented as a form of
‘Westoxication’, is generally resisted, the history of European modernity
itself must be ‘provincialized’: questioned in its ethnocentric universalistic
presumptions, situated in its peculiar and contingent historical context
and conditions and rewritten in its entanglement with imperialism (Dipesh
Chakrabarty). The other move to define Globalization is the attention
nowadays paid by preference to the locally accentuated versions of
modernity (Partha Chatterjee, Arjun Appadurai, Avijit Pathak and many
others).The very concept of hybridity itself, as the new quintessential
feature of contemporary culture, has been conceived and given theoretical
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dignity largely through eminent Indian intellectuals and artists. Many of
them, like you, are now stars of the international Academic system.
Professor Khilnani, what’s your position with regard to the centrality
accorded to the role of culture in shaping new globalized scenarios for the
third millennium?
Both in its spiritual mystic version, as the land of Ayurvedic wisdom
and New Age wonders, and in the more recent dynamic, colourful,
metropolitan ‘shining’ image conveyed by movies and novels, India is
central in the contemporary western picture of the world. What do you
make of these images, are they to be dismissed as only the latest form taken
by Orientalistic attitudes, now expressed in terms of marketing and
consumerist assimilation, or do they constitute a possible space of approach,
of meeting, of improving reciprocal knowledge and symmetrical cultural
exchange, however imprecise and entangled in desires and projections
this may be?
In your opinion what are the chances and the still substantial limits of
India’s presence on the international scene as a protagonist, in economics
and politics as well as in culture? Does it gain more power from the strength
of its cultural identity, its economic vitality, or its nuclear power?
And finally, since you are at the moment based in the USA, what’s your
position towards the new American leadership? Do you feel optimistic about
the opportunities of a new multilateralism in international questions?
SK: Indians have always – or at least for the past 200 or more years - been
very concerned with how the world sees them: not least because they do
see themselves as part of a universalist project of humanistic progress.
This sensitivity to India’s place in the world continues today- and because
India still lacks what people like to call ‘hard’ power, Indians have taken
refuge and comfort in the idea that they have considerable ‘soft’ power,
based on cultural products etc. But I think this can be self-deluding. Culture
has become an object of mass marketing and consumption – this is certainly
true of how many aspects and products from India are today circulated.
Real ‘soft’ power is the ability to persuade by non-coercive means – Gandhi
was the first practitioner of this. Here, India continues to have some abilities
– but it needs to develop these. Ultimately, the source of such persuasive
power will have to lie on India’s continuing political legitimacy – as a
democracy, based on pluralism and tolerance. If India does damage to
this aspect of its identity, its legitimacy will weaken. But if India really
wants to be able to pursue its own interests in the world order, and defend
itself against threats which arise from this, it will definitely need to develop
its economic as well as its military capacities – that latter need is a sad but
true fact of life for any modern state. It’s particularly true for India, which
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is located in one of the most volatile regions of the world, surrounded by
an arc of failing and authoritarian states. In this task, India must devise its
own protections: it cannot rely on other friends to do this for it. The US
under President Obama, for instance, is preparing to engage much more
intensively with Pakistan and Afghanistan – but this will be entirely to
pursue American interests, which do not by any means always coincide
with India’s. India has to be prepared to develop a coherent conception
of hard power – and to accumulate such power.
RC: Thank you very much.
